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‘A man who dares to waste one hour of time has not discovered the value of life’ 
 Charles Darwin 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many accidents do not only result in property losses or personal injuries, but also in what is 
commonly referred to as ‘a loss of time’. Breaches of contract may result in the same. A 
traffic accident may involve having to wait for the police to arrive and for the vehicle(s) to be 
removed, hospitalization and in case a legal conflict arises out of the accident, it involves 
spending time on adjudication. A delayed or cancelled flight may result in having to spend 
additional time at the airport. Part of this ‘loss of time’ may regard pecuniary losses, such as 
foregone income or paid interest. In this contribution, however, I will focus on the non-
pecuniary aspect of ‘loss of time’ rather than on the pecuniary part. People may lose utility 
from the mere fact that some of their valuable time is taken by the damaging event. After all, 
they cannot spend this time anymore in the way they would have wanted to. 
Technically speaking, people obviously do not ‘lose’ time, because they still have 24 hours in 
a full day and seven days in a week. The phrase ‘loss of time’ is not fully correct. The 
problem is rather that people lose the opportunity to spend their time in the preferred way. 
They are forced to spend this time in a less-preferred way, such as hanging around at the 
airport, lying in a hospital bed, being present at trial, et cetera. The value of time therefore is 
context-dependent. Still, I will use the phrase ‘loss of time’ (henceforth without quotation 
marks) as a shorthand notation. 
In Section 2 I will sketch how non-pecuniary loss is dealt with in the economic analysis of 
tort law (I will focus on tort law rather than on contract law). I will discuss the so-called 
‘prevention theory’ and ‘insurance theory’ of non-pecuniary loss, as well as some of the 
criticism that is developed regarding the latter. I will conclude this section with the viewpoint 
that non-pecuniary losses should be included in tort damages in order to provide potential 
tortfeasors with the correct behavioural incentives. In Section 3 I will spend attention to 
economic research regarding ‘the value of time’, as well as to the question whether people 
treat time and money in a similar fashion. The saying ‘time is money’ suggests that they do, 
but Section 3 will place some question marks in this respect. This section will show that 
economic research has not found a ‘one size fits all’ value of time, but rather results in 
complicated formulas in which many different factors play a role, many of which are of a 
more pecuniary nature. Given that such complicated functions are not well applicable in tort 
cases, in Section 4 I provide an (overly?) simplistic idea of a possible assessment of the value 
of lost time. In that Section, the link to the above quote from Charles Darwin will become 
clear. In Section 5, I will conclude. 
 
 
2. The Law and Economics of non-pecuniary tort damages 
 
2.1 Introduction 
                                                
* Associate professor in Law and Economics, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE), Erasmus Law 
School, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
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From an economic point of view, tort law deals with the internalization of negative 
externalities. In the economic analysis of tort law, minimization of total accident costs is 
regarded as the paramount goal.1 This implies that tort damages are not primarily intended to 
compensate the victim for his losses, but to provide adequate behavioural incentives for the 
parties involved to avoid such losses. Generally speaking, this means that tort damages 
should fully reflect the losses that the injurer has caused, because otherwise the tortfeasor 
does not receive adequate incentives.2 The losses which are too expensive to avoid should be 
optimally spread over society. Finally, the administrative costs of the legal system should be 
taken into account; they should not outweigh the benefits of deterrence and loss spreading.3
 
 
2.2 Non-Pecuniary Losses 
 
In the Law and Economics literature, the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
losses is made as follows.4 Pecuniary losses consist of a loss of wealth or of a replaceable 
good. Damages can fully compensate such losses. The lost wealth is restored, the replaceable 
good is repaired or replaced, or the amount of damages enables such repair or replacement. 
The loss in utility which resulted from the pecuniary loss therefore can be fully compensated, 
so that the victim can be brought back to the utility position he had before the damaging 
event. With non-pecuniary losses, on the other hand, an irreplaceable good is damaged or 
destroyed, which leads to a direct loss in utility. This loss cannot be repaired and the lost 
utility cannot be recovered. Of course, if the victim would receive an amount of money as 
damages, this money would yield utility so that damages can still try to bring the victim as 
much as possible back into a situation comparable with before, but it will not be the same 
position. After all, the irreplaceable good is still lost, and in return the victim now has more 
money than before. It remains to be seen, however, if damages are really able to (fully) 
compensate the immaterial loss. 
Cooter and Ulen spend attention to the problem of how courts should assign a money value to 
nonpecuniary losses. Compensation which brings the victim back to the same utility level he 
had before the accident, is ‘the right goal for courts trying to internalize costs, but 
implementing the goal is difficult for intangible, but real, harms’.5 This is the case because 
these subjective losses cannot be observed or measured, and because the money received 
does not make up for the immaterial loss.  
The Law and Economics literature, to my knowledge, does not distinguish between different 
types of immaterial losses. Pain and suffering, losing an irreplaceable painting, suffering 
emotional loss, all these forms are treated under the general heading of non-pecuniary losses. 
                                                
1 G. CALABRESI, The Costs of Accidents. A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5th printing, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1977, 29. Also see, among many others, W.M. LANDES and R.A. POSNER, The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1987; S. SHAVELL., Economic 
Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1987; S. SHAVELL, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2004; R.D. COOTER and T.S. ULEN, Law and Economics, 5th ed., Boston, Massachusetts, 
Pearson Addison Wesley, 2008, 325ff. 
2 For reference to literature and a discussion of complications which warrant deviating from this general starting 
point, see e.g. L.T. VISSCHER, “Tort Damages”, in: M.G. FAURE, (ed.), Tort Law and Economics. Encyclopedia 
of Law and Economics, Second Edition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009, 153-200. 
3 Calabresi labels the sum of care costs and expected accident losses primary accident costs, the costs of having 
to bear the expected accident losses secondary accident costs and the administrative costs tertiary accident 
costs. 
4 S. SHAVELL, Accident Law, 133; S. SHAVELL, Foundations, 242. 
5 R.D. COOTER and T.S. ULEN, Law and Economics, 328. 
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Therefore, before switching to the topic of loss of time, I will discuss the Law and Economics 
approach to non-pecuniary losses in general. 
 
 
2.3 The Prevention Theory 
 
The prevention theory is rather straightforward. In order to provide the potential injurer with 
the correct behavioral incentives, he has to internalize the full externality he has caused. This 
implies that he has to compensate both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, because both 
types constitute losses to the victim. If the injurer does not face both types of losses in the 
expected damages, he does not fully internalize the negative externalities of his behavior, and 
tort law then cannot reach its preventive goal. The result would then be a too low care level 
and a too high activity level of the injurer and possibly the opposite for the victim.6 The 
prevention theory hence focuses on Calabresi’s primary accident costs and weighs the 
additional costs of care measures against the resulting decrease in expected accident losses, 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. 
The victim also should receive behavioural incentives and Adams argues that this is a reason 
not to compensate non-pecuniary losses. This way, the victim keeps an interest in avoiding 
the accident, because he will not be fully compensated.7 In my view, this argument 
undervalues the role of contributory or comparative negligence, which exactly aims at 
providing such incentives to the victim. Furthermore, it would result in inadequate incentives 
for the injurer, with all the attached problems. 
 
 
2.4 The Insurance Theory 
 
The insurance theory does not focus on the question ‘what is the correct amount that the 
injurer should pay’, but rather on the question ‘what is the correct amount that the victim 
should receive’? Ott and Schäfer discuss the problem that non-pecuniary losses are difficult 
to assess. Given that these losses do not have a market value, they argue that one should 
determine in an indirect way how many resources should be spent on precautionary 
measures. A possible way to do this is to investigate how much money people are willing to 
spend on insurance against non-pecuniary losses.8 Compensation should only be provided for 
losses against which rational individuals would purchase insurance. If they would not buy 
insurance against immaterial losses, tort law should not force such coverage upon them.9
This theory compares tort law with insurance, in the sense that both systems may provide an 
amount of money to a victim. Especially in situations where the victim in the end is 
essentially the one who is paying for his own damages award, the comparison makes much 
                                                
6 M. ADAMS, “Warum kein Ersatz von Nichtvermögensschäden?”, in: C. OTT and H.-B. SCHÄFER (eds.), 
Allokationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1989, 213, 214; C. OTT and H.-B. SCHÄFER, 
“Schmerzensgeld bei Körperverletzungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse”, Juristenzeitung, 1990, 566; J. ARLEN, 
“Tort Damages”, in: B. BOUCKAERT and G. DE GEEST (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Volume II. 
Civil Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000, 702; S. SHAVELL, Foundations, 242; R.D. COOTER 
and T.S. ULEN, Law and Economics, 326ff. 
7 M. ADAMS, Nichtvermögensschäden, 214. 
8 C. OTT and H.-B. SCHÄFER, Schmerzensgeld, 566. 
9 S. SHAVELL, Accident Law, 228ff; 133; M. ADAMS, Nichtvermögensschäden, 216, 217; C. OTT and H.-B. 
SCHÄFER, Schmerzensgeld, 568; P.H. RUBIN and J.E. CALFEE, “Consequences of Damage Awards for Hedonic 
and Other Nonpecuniary Losses”, Journal of Forensic Economics, 1992, 249ff; E.S. PRYOR, “The Tort Law 
Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation”, Virginia 
Law Review, 1993, 101ff; S. SHAVELL, Foundations, 269ff.  
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sense. For example, in a situation of product liability or medical malpractice, the liable party 
may try to incorporate the expected liability in the price of the product or service. The greater 
the expected liability, the higher the price for the product or service may become. Therefore, 
including non-pecuniary losses in the damages makes the product or service more expensive. 
In this sense, potential victims, if they are also consumers of the relevant goods or services, 
pay a kind of ‘premium’ for the increased tort protection. 
The relevant question therefore is: do rational individuals take out insurance against non-
pecuniary losses? The answer of the insurance theory is ‘no’. This can most easily be 
explained by starting with pecuniary losses. A standard assumption which is made in Law 
and Economics is that wealth has a decreasing marginal utility. After all, an individual will 
spend his wealth on his needs in a decreasing order of urgency. The first Euros will be spent 
on things such as food, drinks, clothing and housing. Subsequent Euros will be spent on less 
urgent needs, so that the additional utility an additional Euro provides decreases with the 
level of wealth. Marginal utility of wealth remains positive. This idea is reflected in the 
familiar Figure 1 below. The concavity of the function expresses the decreasing marginal 
utility of wealth. After all, twice as large an increase in wealth results in less than twice as 
large an increase in utility. Figure 1 also shows a pecuniary loss of 10,000, bringing our 
subject from a wealth of 20,000 to a wealth of 10,000. The marginal utility of wealth is 
expressed by the slope of the curve and given that this slope by definition becomes steeper as 
we go to the left, marginal utility of wealth increases after a pecuniary loss. This implies that 
after the loss, money is worth more to our subject. This is regarded as an important reason 
why risk-averse persons (who indeed experience a decreasing marginal utility of wealth) 
want to take out insurance. The insurance allows them to exchange money with a low 
marginal utility (the insurance premium) for money with a higher marginal utility (the 
insurance payment after the insured event has occurred).10 Figure 1 also clearly shows that 
receiving an amount of money (from the insurer or from the tortfeasor in the form of 
damages) enables our subject to return to starting point A. 
 
Figure 1. Decreasing marginal utility of wealth and pecuniary loss 
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10 See e.g. S.P. CROLEY and J.D. HANSON, “The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages 
in Tort Law”, Harvard Law Review, 1995, 1822.  
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With non-pecuniary losses, however, our subject does not lose wealth, but he losses utility in 
a direct way. In Figure 2 below, the utility curve of our subject shifts downward with the non-
pecuniary loss. However, marginal utility of wealth does not change as a result of the non-
pecuniary loss (in Section 2.5 I will return to the issue whether there are reasons to assume 
that marginal utility of wealth may increase due to non-pecuniary losses). This implies that 
our subject has no reason to insure himself against non-pecuniary losses. Such insurance 
would not enable him to exchange money with a low marginal utility for money with a high 
marginal utility. On the contrary, paying the insurance premium costs money so that marginal 
utility of wealth increases before the loss, and if the insured event happens and the insured 
receives a sum of money from the insurance, this will be money with a lower marginal utility 
because it has to bring him to a wealth level higher than his starting position in order to make 
up for the lost utility. 
 
 Figure 2. Non-pecuniary loss 
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Hence, if marginal utility of wealth remains the same after the non-pecuniary loss, a rational 
person would not self-insure against such losses and therefore, according to the insurance 
theory, tort law should not compensate such losses. This is indeed what the insurance theory 
argues.11 Even more, it is sometimes argued that marginal utility of wealth will decrease due 
to the non-pecuniary loss. In a setting of personal injuries, such non-pecuniary losses (e.g. 
pain and suffering or decreased quality of life due to an amputation or paralysis) remove 
certain ways in which the victim can spend his wealth, and this likely lowers the marginal 
utility of wealth. After all, if the remaining activities which the victim can still undertake 
yield more utility, he would already have chosen those activities before the non-pecuniary 
loss. Therefore, such new activities either have the same or lower marginal utility than the 
previous activities.12 Danzon investigates whether people take out full insurance coverage 
against non-pecuniary losses and whether such losses are included in compulsory public 
coverage. She finds that full coverage for all losses ‘far exceeds the coverage people are 
                                                
11 Also see P.J. COOK and D.A. GRAHAM (1977), “The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of 
Irreplaceable Commodities”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1977, 151, 155; H.L. FELDMAN, “Harm and 
Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation”, Texas Law Review, 1997, 1572ff.  
12 D.D. FRIEDMAN, “What is ‘Fair Compensation’ for Death or Injury?”, International Review of Law and 
Economics, 1982, 82.  
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prepared to pay for given the choice’.13 Empirical research suggests that injuries indeed 
reduce the marginal utility of wealth.14 Finally, the fact that in practice there is no demand for 
and supply of first party insurance against non-pecuniary losses is regarded as an additional 
reason to assume that rational people do not want such insurance. 
 
 
2.5 Critical Appraisal of the Insurance Theory 
 
The arguments of the insurance theory did not remain unchallenged. First, the empirical 
research that suggests that marginal utility of wealth decreases after suffering non-pecuniary 
losses due to personal injuries asks non-disabled people how they assess the impact of such 
losses. Given the informational problems and the inability to assess how a disability may 
transform ones preferences, values, desires, et cetera, it is doubtful whether non-disabled 
people can accurately assess the impact of such injuries on the marginal utility of money. 
Insights regarding adaptation suggest that this research results in an underestimation of the 
marginal utility, so that in fact, it may increase after suffering the non-pecuniary loss.15 
Second, it is possible that a downward shift in the utility curve also influences its shape. The 
non-pecuniary loss lowers the so-called ‘baseline utility’, and this may affect marginal 
‘baseline-dependent utility’, while marginal ‘baseline-independent utility’ may remain the 
same. Depending on the elements in the utility function, both baseline-dependent and 
baseline-independent, the mere downward shift of the utility curve may therefore also change 
its shape, slope et cetera. Therefore, it is perfectly possible that marginal utility of wealth 
increases after suffering the non-pecuniary loss. Rational victims may want to take out 
insurance against such losses, because the money received enables them to increase the 
baseline utility again.16 Third, the fact that there is no clear demand for such insurances may 
be caused by imperfect information regarding the extent of the non-pecuniary losses, the 
probability of their occurrence and the compensation needed, countervailing social norms in 
the form of societal rejection of pricing pain and sorrow and legal restrictions such as the 
indemnity principle.17 Fourth, on the supply side of the insurance market, adverse selection 
and moral hazard occur due to limited monitoring possibilities regarding non-pecuniary 
losses, which may prevent insurers to offer such insurance.18 Finally, the argument of the 
insurance theory that marginal utility either remains the same or even decreases is based on 
non-pecuniary losses due to personal injuries. For the topic of this paper this line of reasoning 
is not convincing. In cases of loss of time, it is plausible that the need for money may 
increase. The fact that the victim now has less time left to do the things he originally wanted 
to do, may result in a situation where he has to hire others to help him. For example, if a 
person is involved in a traffic accident during his holidays due to which he cannot return in 
time, he may have to take leave from his work for that period. These days cannot be used 
anymore to e.g. paint the house, so that he may have to hire people for this. It is not likely 
that this loss can be constructed as pecuniary loss resulting from the accident because the 
causal link may be too remote, but it is clear that the need for money increased due to the loss 
of time which resulted from the accident. 
                                                
13 P.M. DANZON, “Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets”, Journal of Legal 
Studies, 1984, 524. Also see S.P. CROLEY and J.D. HANSON, Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents, 1801. 
14 W.K. VISCUSI and W.N. EVANS, “Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic 
Implications”, The American Economic Review, 1990, 353-374. 
15 E.S. PRYOR, Kingdom of the Ill, 116, 117. 
16 S.P. CROLEY and J.D. HANSON, Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents, 1815, 1827, 1834. 
17 Ibid., 1845ff. 
18 R.R. BOVBJERG, F.A. SLOAN and J.F. BLUMSTEIN, “Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling ‘Pain and 
Suffering’”, Northwestern University Law Review, 1989, 934. 
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2.6 Insurance, Ex Ante Compensation or Ex Post Compensation? 
 
The discussion between the prevention theory and the insurance theory made clear that 
different views exist regarding the question whether non-pecuniary losses should be included 
in tort damages. Also, the statement that rational people do not want to self-insure against 
non-pecuniary losses was challenged. However, irrespective of this last issue, even if people 
would not want to self-insure, they still are willing to spend resources to lower the probability 
of suffering such losses. Even if such losses would not increase marginal utility of wealth of 
the victims, they still lower the utility for the victim. It is therefore socially desirable to 
include them in the weighing between costs and benefits of taking care. The fact that victims 
would be willing to spend resources on accident avoidance and that it is therefore desirable to 
provide behavioural incentives to injurers clearly shows from Figure 3.19  
 
Figure 3: Insurance, Ex Ante Compensation and Ex Post Compensation 
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The non-pecuniary loss results in a downward shift of the utility curve and our victim moves 
from A to B. Given that the slope of the utility curve in A and B is exactly the same, 
according to the insurance theory there is no demand for insurance. However, before the 
accident happens, the victim is willing to spend an amount of wealth up to (B-C) in order to 
avoid the accident, because the overall level of utility in B and C is the same. Therefore, if 
avoidance measures would cost less than (B-C), the victim would profit from avoiding the 
loss, because his utility without the loss but net of his avoidance costs is higher than UB. If a 
potential injurer would have to pay damages for non-pecuniary losses equal to (B-C), he 
would be incentivized to take the care measures which the victim found worthwhile ex ante. 
The ex ante damages in the numerical example of Figure 3 amount to €7,000. In contrast, ex 
post damages, which serve to bring the victim back to his original utility level UA after the 
losses have been suffered, would amount to €13,000. A wealth of €33,000 after having 
suffered the non-pecuniary loss results in utility level UD, which is identical to UA. It is also 
clear that, had the non-pecuniary loss been larger, it might not have been possible to bring the 
                                                
19 Also see J.E. CALFEE and P.H. RUBIN, “Some Implications of Damages Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses”, 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1992, 376. 
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victim back to his original utility level, so that full ex post compensation then would not have 
been possible. 
In my view, the ex ante approach forms the correct basis for determining damages for non-
pecuniary losses. Because non-pecuniary losses are not losses in goods which are transferred 
on a market, there is no direct price mechanism to assess the losses. The resources potential 
victims are willing to spend to try to avoid the losses form a good alternative. By connecting 
to the resources victims themselves would have been willing to spend on accident avoidance, 
the victims are not under- or overcompensated. In addition, potential injurers are not over 
deterred, because they in essence bear the costs of avoidance measures which were 
worthwhile ex ante. 
 
 
3. Some Economic Thoughts on the Value of Time 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this Section, I will discuss economic research which is relevant for the assessment of loss 
of time as non-pecuniary loss. Before doing this, however, it is important to spend some 
words on the question how accurate this assessment should be done. Obviously, damages 
should not systematically deviate from social losses, because tort law then would not be able 
to provide correct incentives. However, a more accurate assessment is more costly, so that a 
trade-off exists between the costs of accurate assessment on the one hand, and the quality of 
the behavioural incentives on the other hand.20  
In this respect it is important to keep in mind that the behavioural incentives work ex ante, 
when the injurer does not yet know how high the losses exactly are. He will base his 
behaviour on an estimation of the average losses and therefore, a more accurate damage 
assessment ex post does not necessarily result in better incentives ex ante. It is important that 
damages are correct on average, but not necessarily in every individual case. Only if the 
damages systematically deviate from the social losses, the injurer will receive incorrect 
incentives.21  
This implies that for the topic of loss of time, it is not necessary to exactly determine the 
value of time for the victim involved, as long as on average the loss is assessed correctly. If it 
turns out that this value is low and that the costs of assessing the loss are not negligible, it 
may be preferable to disregard the losses, or better to use simple tables or formulas.22 The 
decrease in tertiary accident costs then outweighs the increase in primary accident costs. 
In the remainder of Section 3, I will spend attention to economic research regarding the value 
of time. This research may enable us to assess the value of time in a way which is general 
enough to include in the assessment of tort damages, without high assessment costs. 
 
 
3.2 Economic Research Regarding the Value of Time 
 
In 1965, Gary Becker published his Theory of the allocation of time, in which he argues that 
economic theory should not only include the prices of goods in analyzing choice behaviour, 
                                                
20 Hence, a trade-off between Calabresi’s primary and tertiary accident costs. See G. CALABRESI, The Costs of 
Accidents. 
21 L. KAPLOW and S. SHAVELL, “Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages”, Journal of Law and Economics, 
1996, 191-210; L. KAPLOW and S. SHAVELL, Fairness versus Welfare, Cambridge, Massachusetts,  Harvard 
University Press, 2002, 265 ff. 
22 S. SHAVELL, Accident Law, 134; S. SHAVELL, Foundations, 242. 
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but also the time that the chosen activities take to carry out.23 The full costs of an activity do 
not only consist of the market price, but also of the time it takes to carry out the activity, 
because this time could have been used productively elsewhere. People do not only operate 
under a budget constraint, but also under a time constraint. The budget constraint is linked to 
the time constraint, because people could convert time into money by spending more time on 
work and less on consumption. Becker describes that households in richer countries may 
forfeit money income in order to obtain additional utility, e.g. by increasing their leisure time. 
According to him, ‘the amount of money income forfeited measures the costs of obtaining 
additional utility’.24 Hence, Becker connects the value of leisure time to the wage rate of the 
person involved. This idea has been criticized, e.g. because it disregards possible constraints 
on the number of hours a person can work and it does not include (dis)utility from work.25
DeSerpa distinguishes between two types of time constraint.26 The time resource constraint 
implies that the amounts of time allocated to all activities add up to the total available time. 
The time consumption constraint reflects the fact that an individual may decide to spend more 
than the minimum required amount of time on a certain activity. DeSerpa also distinguishes 
between several ‘values of time’, which shows that there is no ‘one size fits all’ value of time. 
The value of time as a resource is the money value of an increase in available time. It is 
determined by the ratio between the marginal utility of time and the marginal utility of 
income, which of course depends also on the level of income and the wage rate. It derives its 
value from the fact that time is scarce. The value of time as a commodity is the value of the 
time allocated to a certain activity, which is determined by the ratio of the marginal utility of 
the activity and the marginal utility of money. The value of time saving, finally, is the 
willingness to pay to reduce the amount of time allocated to a certain activity, such as travel. 
This value is zero for activities to which the individual freely assigns more time than is 
necessary. DeSerpa labels such activities as leisure activities. All leisure activities must have 
the same marginal value (otherwise the individual would reallocate time to the activity with 
the larger marginal value), which equals the value of time as a resource.27  
Jara-Díaz et al. try to estimate this value of leisure empirically. It depends on, inter alia, the 
time assigned to work, the wage rate, the price and quantity of the consumed goods, the 
income from other sources than work and the time committed to other activities.28 The 
authors have collected data on the relevant parameters in Karlsruhe (Germany), Santiago 
(Chile) and Thurgau (Switzerland). The datasets differ in the way in which they were 
collected and in their level of detail, which may make the comparison problematic. By 
studying how people in these three regions allocate their time to work, travel time, time at 
home, and differences between weekdays and weekend days, the authors found a value of 
leisure of  €2.94 per hour in Santiago, €13.69 per hour in Karlsruhe and €26.06 per hour in 
Thurgau.29 Given the fact that so many factors are relevant in these estimations, the authors 
state that it is not straightforward how these large differences should be interpreted.30
                                                
23 G.S. BECKER, “A Theory of the Allocation of Time”, The Economic Journal, 1965, 494. 
24 Ibid., 498. 
25 D.M. LARSON and S.L. SHAIKH, “Recreation Demand Choices and Revealed Values of Leisure Time”, 
Economic Inquiry, 2004, 265. 
26 A.C. DESERPA, “A Theory of the Economics of Time”, The Economic Journal, 1971, 830. 
27 Ibid., 833ff. Also see S.R. JARA-DÍAZ, M.A. MUNIZAGA, P. GREEVEN, R. GUERRA and K. AXHAUSEN, 
“Estimating the value of leisure from a time allocation model”, Transportation Research Part B, 2008, 946. 
28 S.R. JARA-DÍAZ et al., Value of leisure, 950. 
29 Ibid., 955. Unless indicated differently, all amounts in my paper are expressed in 2011 dollars, by converting 
the original amounts with the inflation calculator from www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm and 
subsequently expressing them in Euros via the OECD purchasing power parity 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE4). 
30 Ibid., 956. 
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Lee and Kim argue that the wage rate often is not a good proxy for the value of leisure time, 
different than what Becker suggested, because many people work fixed hours.31 Instead, they 
use data from a panel study in which respondents were questioned regarding their willingness 
to reduce working hours so that they can have more leisure. This way, they find a value of 
leisure of about €11.20 per hour.32
Álvarez-Farizo et al. study the trade-offs between travel time to outdoor leisure activities, on-
site time and money, in order to assess the value of leisure time.33 It is important to include 
the travel time costs into the models estimating the value of a recreational area; otherwise this 
area will be undervalued. The travel time costs express how much people are willing to invest 
in order to go to the particular area. Many studies use, based on Becker, the wage rate as 
opportunity cost of time, but the authors state that this is often not realistic. If the person 
involved would not have travelled to area A, he probably would have spent his time on 
another leisure activity, rather than on work. The wage-method also is no solution for non-
working or unemployed parties. And, as mentioned before, it overlooks fixed contracts and 
(dis)utility at work.34 The authors use a survey regarding a Spanish national park. The 
average willingness to pay to reduce travel time for leisure purposes they find is €6.35 per 
hour.35
Besides these studies on the value of leisure, there also exists much research regarding the 
value of travel time savings. This value is an important factor in evaluating whether 
infrastructural works, which aim at decreasing travel time, are worth their costs.36 The value 
of travel time savings can be expressed as the value of leisure minus the money value of 
travel time itself.37 Especially in the United Kingdom, much research has been done to assess 
the value of travel time, which is reviewed by Wardman in 1998.38 Many factors influence 
this value, such as the distance, the mode of transportation, the purpose of the journey, and 
the type of journey (urban, suburban, inter-urban). The overall values of time found by 
Wardman are about €7.09 per hour for non-business travel and about €25.40 for business 
travel.39 This large difference suggests that pecuniary considerations play an important role in 
the estimated value of time, while my paper is primarily interested in the non-pecuniary 
aspects of a loss of time. It is important to keep in mind that none of the values presented 
above focus on the non-pecuniary aspect, so they will all contain more or less pecuniary 
elements. 
 
The above overview of economic research made clear that the value of time is a complicated 
concept. One cannot simply use the wage rate as an approximation for the value of time, as 
one might initially be inclined to do. Many factors influence the valuation of time, and the 
empirical estimations widely differ. In my view it is not well possible to include all the 
relevant parameters in a tort claim in which the victim, besides damages for property loss, 
personal injuries et cetera, also requests damages for loss of time as non-pecuniary loss, 
                                                
31 K. LEE and I.-M. KIM, “Estimating the value of leisure time in Korea”, Applied Economics Letters, 2005, 639. 
32 Ibid., 641. 
33 B. ÁLVAREZ-FARIZO, N. HANLEY and R. BARBERÁN, “The Value of Leisure Time: A Contingent Rating 
Approach”, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2001, 682. 
34 Ibid., 683. 
35 Ibid., 691. 
36 See e.g. P.J. MACKIE, S. JARA-DÍAZ and A.S. FOWKES, “The value of travel time savings in evaluation”, 
Transport Research Part E, 2001, 91. 
37 Ibid., 94. 
38 M. WARDMAN, “The Value of Travel Time. A Review of British Evidence”, Journal of Transport Economics 
and Policy, 1998, 285-316. 
39 Ibid., 295, 296. The original UK amounts are corrected for inflation via 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/inflation/calculator/flash/default.aspx and subsequently expressed 
in Euros. 
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because this would be too complicated and would therefore involve too high tertiary costs. 
Given the remarks on accuracy, it would be better to find a simpler way to assess such losses. 
In Section 4 I will propose a (too?) simple way of thinking about the possible size of such 
losses. But first, I will discuss interesting literature which suggests that people may not 
(always) treat time and money in a similar fashion. 
 
 
3.3 Time is Money? 
 
It is well known that many people fall prey to the sunk cost effect. They pay attention to non-
recoverable past costs in deciding their current actions and may be willing to invest additional 
money, simply because they have already spent money on it earlier. Economically speaking, 
such past costs should be irrelevant, because decisions should be taken on the basis of current 
(and possibly future) marginal costs and benefits. Thaler argues that the sunk cost effect can 
be understood with the concept of ‘mental accounting’.40 If a person e.g. buys a concert ticket 
well in advance of the concert, he has ‘opened a mental account’, which now has a deficit. If 
the person attends the concert, the account will be balanced and closed. If the person cannot 
attend the concert, the account will be closed at a loss. To avoid this loss, the person is 
willing to spend additional resources (in an example of Thaler: to drive through a blizzard) so 
that the mental account can be closed without a loss. 
Soman hypothesizes that the sunk cost effect may not play a similar role if the investment 
took place in time rather than in money, because (1) time cannot be inventoried or replaced, 
(2) it is not as easily aggregated as money and (3) accounting for time is not a routine 
activity. In addition, the perception of the time invested may not correspond with the actual 
time invested, because the perception depends on how much the person (dis)likes the 
activity.41 In several experiments, Soman tests if the sunk cost effect also appears if the 
investment is done in time. For example, in an experiment half of the subjects was told that 
by working for fifteen hours as student assistant they have earned a ticket to a theatre 
performance and by working another five hours they also have earned a ticket to a rock 
concert. Due to some rescheduling, the events turn out to take place on the same night. The 
subjects are told that they prefer the rock concert. When asked where they would go, over 
95% chose the rock concert. The other half of the subjects was asked the same thing, but here 
the tickets were bought for €45 and €15 respectively. Now, 62% chose to go to the theatre, 
even though they preferred the rock concert. The relative weight of the sunk costs was the 
same: the theatre was three times as ‘expensive’ as the rock concert, but the sunk cost effect 
was much stronger if the investment was in money.42  
A possible explanation is that people do not have the ‘unbalanced mental account’ when it 
comes to time, because they are not well able to calculate with time. In experiments where 
the subjects were provided a way to better calculate the time investment (e.g. by referring to 
an hourly wage, or by distinguishing subjects who had previous education about the value of 
time versus those who did not), the sunk cost effect reappeared. So when subjects had a way 
to attach money values to the time invested, they responded comparable to how they would 
have done if the investment was in money rather than time.43  
This point is corroborated by research that shows that people who work for an hourly wage 
tend to make different trade-offs between time and money than those who have a fixed 
                                                
40 R.H. THALER, “Mental Accounting Matters”, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 1999, 190ff. 
41 D. SOMAN, “The Mental Accounting of Sunk Time Costs: Why Time is not Like Money”, Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 2001, 171, 172. 
42 Ibid., 173ff. 
43 Ibid., 177ff. 
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contract.44 Having experience in calculating time leads to a more economic use of time as a 
resource. In experiments, people who have experience with hourly wages or with time 
writing turn out to be willing to trade more time for money than those who have no 
experience. The possible explanation is that the former group has a clearer idea about the 
value of their time. The same result is reached when people without an hourly wage first had 
to calculate their own hourly wage before the experiment started, e.g. by dividing their 
monthly income by the number of worked hours.45
 
This section has shown that in general, people do not treat time and money the same. The 
sunk cost effect is much weaker, or even absent, in case of time investments. This, in my 
view, does not imply that people generally do not care about forgone time investments so that 
loss of time would not have to be included in tort damages. After all, in experiments where 
subjects were trained or helped in assessing the money value of their time, they behaved 
comparable to situations where the investment was in money. The different way in which 
people approach time and money therefore seems to be more a matter of difficulty with 
accounting with time than of not finding time valuable. 
 
 
4. A (too?) Simple Estimation of the Non-Pecuniary Value of Time 
 
The previous sections have shown that in principle, non-pecuniary losses should be included 
in tort damages, but that there is no simple answer to the question what the correct value of 
time is. This value depends on many circumstances, which are too complicated to include in 
the calculation of tort damages. The empirical research regarding the value of leisure time 
and of travel time savings yields widely divergent amounts, which also encompass pecuniary 
elements. Still, the desire not to systematically exclude non-pecuniary losses from tort 
damages, combined with the knowledge that accuracy is not required in every individual 
case, leads me to propose a simple calculation which may shed some light on a possible value 
of the non-pecuniary value of time.  
The basic idea is that losing time will (almost?) never be as serious as losing life, so that the 
non-pecuniary aspects of ‘the value of life’ provide an upper boundary to any assessment of 
the non-pecuniary value of time.46 In the remainder of this section I will spend attention to 
several measures which deal with the ‘value of life’. I realize that none of those measures has 
been developed to express the value of time. I also do not suggest that they do express the 
value of time, but I do think that, under the assumption that losing life is worse than merely 
losing time, they can provide relevant information regarding the value of time. 
 
In Section 2.6 it became clear that damages for non-pecuniary losses should be based on the 
victim’s ex ante willingness to pay to avoid the loss. One of the best known examples of a 
willingness to pay measure (in this case to avoid fatalities) is the value of a statistical life 
(VSL). It is derived from decisions which people take which influence health and safety, such 
as buying a dangerous product or using safety devices. It shows the implicit trade-off that 
                                                
44 S.E. DEVOE and J. PFEFFER, “When time is money: The effect of hourly payment on the evaluation of time”, 
Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 2007, 4. 
45 Ibid., 8ff. 
46 Even though the opening quote of Charles Darwin suggests that the value of time may be in close proximity 
of the value of life, in my view there will almost always be a substantial gap between the two. 
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people make between money and safety.47 The different researches regarding the VSL yield 
different amounts, but according to Sunstein the VSL is set at about €6 million.48
My suggestion is as follows: the VSL is an expression of the value of a (statistical) human 
life. Assuming a certain life expectancy, it is in principle possible to derive a ‘value of a 
statistical life hour’ (VSLH) by dividing the VSL by the number of hours in the average life 
expectancy. For example, the average life expectancy in the Netherlands is about 80 years,49 
hence 701,280 hours. Using an average VSL of €6 million, this would result in a VSLH of 
€8.55 Given that the VSL regards the value of life, the VSLH relates to, simply put, living 
one hour. The topic of this paper, loss of time, deals with e.g. having to wait at the airport or 
having to spend time at trial. This implies that the VSLH will often be higher than the value 
of the lost time. For many situations, the relevant value will be (much) lower. 
Obviously, there are some problems attached to this simple calculation. One of these is the 
fact that the VSL consists of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements, while this paper 
deals only with the non-pecuniary aspect of loss of time. According to Miller, about 50 to 
75% of the VSL consists of immaterial losses.50 This would imply that the non-pecuniary 
part of the VSLH would be about €4.25 to €6.40. 
Another issue may be that the value of time may depend on age and that in calculating back 
from a full life to an hour, issues such as discounting become relevant. In the VSL-literature, 
both possible age differences as well as discounting issues are incorporated by assessing the 
value of a statistical life year (VSLY) rather than a VSL. The VSLY is based on the VSL and 
is assessed by incorporating a discount factor and information on the age of the subjects in 
the VSL research. Sunstein mentions amounts of the VSLY of about €167,500 for people 
under the age of 65, and €266,500 for people above that age. This would result in a non-
pecuniary part of the VSLH of about €9.53 to €14.29 for younger people and €15.20 to 
€22.80 for older people. 
Yet another approach may be to use the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) as a method to 
assess the upper limit of non-pecuniary damages for loss of time.51 This measure expresses 
the quality of life in a number between 1.0 (perfect health) and 0.0 (death). An advantage of 
this method is that QALYs express the impact of health related issues (such as injuries and 
illnesses) on the quality of life, so that they focus on non-pecuniary aspects. In addition, this 
method is able to cover shorter periods of time. Recent European research found an average 
overall mean amount estimated over ten European countries of €65.500 per QALY.52 
Calculating this back to hours would result in an amount of €7.47. 
 
In my view, this last method is the most reliable. As said, QALYs only encompass non-
pecuniary aspects, which avoids having to work with Miller’s range of 50-75%. Also the fact 
that they are able to cover shorter periods of time makes them better applicable than 
calculating back from a statistical life (in which assumptions regarding life expectancy are 
necessary) or a statistical life year. Given the fact that a full QALY expresses the value of life 
and that losing time (almost) always will be less severe than losing life, the amount of €7.47 
again reflects an upper boundary of the non-pecuniary aspect of loss of time. Different than 
                                                
47 See e.g. W.K. VISCUSI and J.E. ALDY, “The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates 
throughout the World”, The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2003, 5-76. 
48 C.R. SUNSTEIN, “Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay”, Columbia Law Review, 2004, 205. 
49www.indexmundi.com/nl/nederland/levensverwachting.html. 
50 T.R. MILLER, “Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?”, Northwestern University Law 
Review, 1989, 893, 894. 
51 For an overview of what QALYs are, see e.g. V. KARAPANOU and L.T. VISSCHER, “Towards a Better 
Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages”,  Journal of European Tort Law, 2010, 48-74. 
52 C. DONALDSON et al., European Value of a Quality Adjusted Life Year- Final Report, 2011, 72, 74. 
Http://research.ncl.ac.uk/eurovaq/EuroVaQ_Final_Publishable_Report_and_Appendices.pdf. 
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with VSL and VSLY, though, QALYs enable a more exact assessment of the value of time 
than merely indicating the upper boundary.  
A method to assess QALY weights of different health related situations which is generally 
regarded as one of the better methods is the Health Utilities Index Mark 3 (HUI3).53 This 
method distinguishes between various physical factors (such as vision, hearing, speech, 
ambulation, and pain), but also mentions ‘emotion’ as a separate category. Given that a mere 
loss of time does not involve physical injuries, one could argue that only this latter category 
is relevant. After all, one could say that during the time that someone is forced to be engaged 
in other activities than the preferred ones, the level of happiness of the victim is lowered. The 
possible levels of emotion in the HUI3 are ‘happy and interested in life’, ‘somewhat happy’, 
‘somewhat unhappy’, ‘very unhappy’ and ‘so unhappy that life is not worthwhile’. In my 
view the last category is too severe to express the impact of a mere loss of time, but the third 
and fourth (so ‘somewhat unhappy’ or ‘very unhappy’) may be a good way to express the fact 
that during the loss of time, the victim yielded no (or at least lower) utility.  
The exact impact of a decrease in the level of happiness on the overall QALY level depends 
on how high the levels of health and happiness of the victim were before the loss of time. In 
the HUI3, the total QALY level is determined by a formula in which all distinguished health 
and happiness factors play a role. If our victim was otherwise healthy and happy, a decrease 
in happiness level to ‘somewhat unhappy’ respectively ‘very unhappy’ would result in a 
decrease in QALY level of about 0.21 to 0.49.54 Assuming the abovementioned value of 
€7.47 per hour which is based on a full QALY, the immaterial value due to loss of time could 
then be assessed at €1.54 to €3.69. 
I therefore propose to set damages for the non-pecuniary loss due to a loss of time at an 
amount between €1.50 and €3.50 per hour, with an average of €2.50 per hour. This would 
result in an amount of €60 per full day. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have argued that non-pecuniary losses should be included in tort damages, and 
that they should be based on the idea of ex ante compensation: how many resources would 
the victim have been willing to spend in order to avoid the losses? In searching for the 
willingness to pay to avoid loss of time, I first have discussed economic research regarding 
the value of time. Theoretical research showed that the value of time depends on a lot of 
factors, which are not readily available in a tort case. Empirical research resulted in amounts 
                                                
53 J. BRAZIER, M. DEVERILL, C. GREEN, R. HARPER and A. BOOTH, “A review of the use of health status 
measures in economic evaluation”, Health Technology Assessment, 1999, 76. 
54 See D. FEENY et al., “Multiattribute and Single-Attribute Utility Functions for the Health Utilities Index Mark 
3 System”, Medical Care, 2002, 124. The formula reads u* = 1.371*b1*b2*b3*b4*b5*b6*b7*b8 - 0.371. In 
this formula, u* is the utility level of the individual under consideration, b1 relates to vision, b2 to hearing, b3 to 
speech, b4 to ambulation, b5 to dexterity, b6 to emotion, b7 to cognition and b8 to pain. Each factor consists of 
five or six levels in which the health level of the individual concerned is expressed. The lower the health level, 
the lower the value of the factor in the formula will be. Regarding the factor ‘emotion’, the five levels are 
already mentioned in the main text above. The connected values of factor b6 in the formula are 1.0 (happy and 
interested in life), 0.95 (somewhat happy), 0.85 (somewhat unhappy), 0.64 (very unhappy) and 0.46 (so 
unhappy that life is not worthwhile). Assuming an otherwise healthy and happy person implies that factors b1 to 
b8 all had a score of 1.0, which implies that the outcome of the formula is 1.371*1*1*1*1*1*1*1*1-0.371 = 
1.371 - 0.371 = 1.0. As explained above, a QALY value of 1.0 means that the person is healthy. If the level of 
happiness due to the loss of time would decrease to ‘somewhat unhappy’, keeping all other factors constant at 
1.0, the outcome of the formula would be 1.371*1*1*1*1*1*0.85*1*1-0.371 = 0.79435. The QALY loss would 
hence be 1.0 – 0.79435 = 0.20565. The outcome of the formula in case of a decrease to ‘very unhappy’ would be 
1.371*1*1*1*1*1*0.64*1*1 – 0.371 = 0.87744 - 0.371= 0.50644. The QALY loss would then be 0.49356. 
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that diverge a lot and that encompass both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects. Under the 
assumption that loss of life is more serious than loss of time, I have argued that research 
regarding the value of life may provide valuable information regarding the upper limit of the 
value of time. In my view, the concept of the Quality Adjusted Life Year is the best measure 
for the topic of this paper, given that a QALY only relates to non-pecuniary aspects and is 
also suitable for shorter periods of time. A good way to assess the value of loss of time is by 
investigating the impact of a decrease in the level of happiness on the QALY level of an 
otherwise happy and healthy victim. Such an analysis results in damages for the non-
pecuniary loss due to a loss of time of €1.50 to €3.50 per hour, with an average of €2.50 per 
hour.  
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